more susceptible to a message, who do we have to work harder with, who is important, who is not, but diversity out there is incredible. it ties in with the need to speak to these people in the languages they speak. in india it is funny, i bring this up, do you ever see two indians speaking english to each other? unless they have an english language listener, they will speak hindi to each other. in the middle east, once they engage in each other, they need to be speaking those languages. we need to be there in those languages. it is where you have to listen to them to what they say, not rely on english. those english language newspapers out there, i remember in pakistan i was speaking to an editor, i said, can you tell what is this about? they said, these are for you, the foreigners. this is not something that pakistanis used to communicate

with each other. that was an important insight, and is one thing that we have to make sure we do not rely on english to out there to interpret what is going on because that is not where the action is. it is in the vernacular and it is important to be there. i wanted to talk about security, which i did in here. in afghanistan or around pakistan, and libya and yemen, security is a huge concern for us. in other places while we have these embassies that are much more secure, real public diplomacy takes place outside and disease. i argue people we want to reach do not come into our facilities. that is where the value is, going into their institutions and meeting them out there. i quoted thomas friedman who came to turkey after the bombings in turkey and he looks at our new consulate, and remarked how this was a bad message. it can be or it is a difficult

message out become it can become, but as public diplomacy officers, you get out of that environment. that is vital. that is why that is not such a key stumbling lock. it is very important to see these other places -- you get out and that is what officers do. finally, or not finally -- sorry -- the next steps in the report by set out a series of recommendations. one thing that is important is and i go back to this 26th report written since 9/11, the one recommendation for everybody was to spend more money on public diplomacy. that is not going to happen. basically, what i tried to come up with, with jeannie's help was, we could come up low-cost or no-cost solutions, because the state department is not looking to dump tons of money

into something new, and in this budget environment it will be a while. what we came up with a lot of the things we could do by shifting emphasize, real things the state department can do. i believe some of them are underway to a certain extent, and i looking forward to this afternoon speaking to a life of people to find out where we are in that way in the state department. let me wrap up and say the limitations of this report -- the limitation is obvious. it just deals with one part of the world. there is a whole world out there. people say, why did you not cover indonesia? in india i am finding a series of public diplomacy ideas that are different than what i had in my report because i'm dealing with a different environment where we are running a country, working in a country that is up to 70% approval ratings, different from what we have that

is covering this report. what i am saying is there were limitations because of time, money, effort, all that sort of thing, but i hope this will spark more reports of what we are doing overseas. it is vital that we understand public the promising. i'm delighted to go to state to speak to people who do that, and i will give them a mini report on my report. i will stop there. what i would like to do, i hope i have given a bit of an overview here. i hope you have a copy of the report, have read it, or looking forward to read is because there is a lot here that will define something that has not been seen before. i am glad that the academics i brought in say we have not had a report from the field, and they have been awaiting this. it was delayed in coming up. the research for this went into the summer of 2012, but now they

have something in the courses where they can look at what we're doing in the field and try to make judgments that might be different than what we hear if they were aligned on material coming out of here. thank you very much, and i look forward to some questions and answers. [applause] >> thank you, walter. as you suggest, there is a lot to chew on there. one thing you did not talk about at all in your report really was the issue of metrics. and one of the things i see the state department, in the fascination with metrics for social media, because social media tends to produce area precise metrics. from your position in the field, what is your sense of the role of metrics, how do you use them, and how are people misusing metrics in ways that we have to stop? >> metrics is a question that is a difficult one or public

diplomacy. you mentioned i was in advertising before, and you always had is the product sell or not? it1 was an interesting metric and if it did not sell well, they fired the ad agency. you would pay that way. they tended to blame the ad agencies first. metrics are something that is difficult. we know that public diplomacy conservatives to the fault of the soviet union. we talked about it, but it played a role in undercutting the intellectual likelihood of the soviet union. today, it is difficult because you can't measure inputs, but not outputs.

there is some work done in the private sector, mostly when someone takes an action to understand that they have absorbed that idea -- i mention it is not just the tweets you do, it is the retweets you have to count. that's one way we do it, but nobody has come up with an idea that says they have changed the way of looking at the united states based on what we have given them their any have tried to do that, the vehicle to do. i did come up with a recommendation, and this is over the years speaking to hill people, hill staffers, one thing we need are narratives. how does this stuff play out writ large? we can bring to get all these public diplomacy programs are on the road, what message are we getting out, pointing to success stories, nodding having exact metric saying we moved the needle from 50 to 60, but saying we are putting out these ideas,

there is an effort, it makes sense, and if your narrative aches cents, able can trust your on to something. that is one of the recognitions i have there, to get out to the hill, get to the state department in the field, more about these narratives that are going on. >> and would that suggest that the number of people engaged, the number of people who are in our audience is less important than creating a dynamic, and we need to be more attuned to the dynamics we create rather than the size of the audience i mean, it sounds to me you are recommending sort of looking at waves and creating ripples rather than trying to measure the force. >> i think that is right. if you go on broadcast television, you get huge numbers.

how many of those people are important to the influencing policy? that is an open question. we have exchange programs and everything we do where we say that as someone who is important to the debate, we want to expose them more, get the people on an exchange program in the united states where they can see what we do. you make judgments about the value of the audience out there, some more valuable than others. when you put it together you draw the conclusion of what you're getting out there, what word is going out there, how much you are causing a debate. to actually measure the impact is difficult. you have got to put all these factors together on that one idea you want to get across and maybe there is another idea and how those blend together. you have got to use all these tools. there are probably at anyone post you could draw up a p.d.

toolkit that would have 25 things that we basically -- and it is all from using a local staff in the vernacular language using the ambassador as a speaker, do use and econ officer as a speaker, using exchange programs to bring in speakers into these countries -- all these different things to get the message out, hitting different audiences that we think our part. how you measure the impact, what moves the needle, that is important. >> as a manager, how do you think about the problems of allocating resources across the entire tool kit? >> at the beginning of going anywhere, you have to sit back and say what are our objectives here? this is something that i have learned that csis and going to exercises with you and around here was trying to see what the goals are upfront and do not worry about the limitation write a but set out the strategic goals. there is a tendency to mix

implementation and strategic goals, and you have to see them as something separate and reach into the toolkit at what works best in that environment. that becomes a judgment call him a more an art than science. if you're in an open country like india, you can do a lot of things. i'm getting out of my where were the report is. you might have difficulties in other places where it is more closed. in the middle east you have a tremendous variety of countries, more open than others, but some can't surprise use. when i was in riyadh, i was amazed at how open they were at engaging in so many topics. outside of saudi arabia, people do not realize, and when you were over there, you're been able to engage and you know that receptivity to what is going on. you try to judge what is the best way to engage the audiences i want to reach. use it as a blend of those two things, the broad media with a more narrow targeted approach. >> you just pursued one other line before we open it up.

you have mostly spent your career overseas, but you had a lovely year in washington. when you presumably are at a target for other embassies' average programs, for public diplomacy in washington. who do you think was especially good? what kinds of things did you see as a target where you said the, you know what can i recognize what they are doing and they are being effective, and we should try to take a page from that and do what we are doing overseas. >> an interesting question. what struck me is how rarely i would think people did engage me. often officers were working on specific countries, that one and this he will engage them, but engaging more broadly you do not come across it as much in the state department. that said you end up with events, certain things-- >> you were at csis, right? >> when i was here? >> yeah. >> we engaged in a love audiences. i do not think anybody targeted me to same way i would have expected. i would think they could do more of that. the think tanks at csis being my

favorite, obviously, have a lot of ideas and a lot of these people they want to engage more with. but i do not see it as much as i would have expected. when i looked at audiences when i was her, i went other thing tanks and i look at the audience as was struck that some embassy people, but i would have expected more. i think probably they be it is because -- i mentioned this, the public the policy function of the state department is unique. every other country does not seem to have the same way. i found that state department people were much more around the city, hitting around them and i see that overseas can engage in the think tax overseas. i noticed other countries doing it less than we do perhaps because they do not have a dedicated function of how am i going to engage that audience. i see that less and less. >> as i look in the audience i see a lot of people who know more about the diplomacy than i do. let me turn it over to you.

yes, sir. do me a favor, three things -- wait for a microphone, identify yourself, and do ask only one question. >> thank you so much. a good presentation. i am a retiree, originally from pakistan. your recommended approach in a muslim country is the same yardstick for kingdoms like saudi arabia or some of the middle eastern countries and pakistan, like a democratic country? >> one thing that comes out is a variety that is out there. we have to shift gears. at one point i talked about a good arabist can take 15 years of training, the guy who can understand advances in the regional culture, the local

cultures, effort arabic that is spoken arabic out there. it is important we recognize diversity and everybody who works overseas sees that. what works in saudi arabia is not something that will work in jordan. they have different levels of openness. in saudi arabia, we had an american archaeology team out there to him was something new and different. in jordan, they have had them there for 100 years, back to the ottoman days. it is different. every country you have to look at it as a different activity. that is one region best reason why you have to have the guy in the field them met with a woman trying to interpret a decent

societies and say what works best here, because as you said, some are open, some have a democrat political process, others do not. others have a monarchy. all these systems demand a different part of the tool kit to go into action. >> how do you think about working a monarchy? you are now in the world's largest democracy, where you have served in one of the world's most important monarchies. how do you think about the targets for public diplomacy in a system where you are not trying to target elected officials? >> some people say there is an audience of one when you have a monarchy. it is much more broader. there are a lot of influences they. the king goes out and goes on trips to meet his subjects, and there are a lot of people eating advice, so i think the important

thing is who are these people, who are opinion leaders there? you want to engage them as much as possible. i think all over that region you deal with varying degrees of democracy and lack of democracy, but you still always have people who influence the debate. you always have a guy who will go on tv and talk about something. talk shows are huge business in this part of the world. these guys will have different ways of portraying it. there are those who do not support government so much or will have a different way. the key thing is to find out who are those people. a systematic watching of live television, something kids are good at, can -- you will find who are the people who speak most about the subject you want, and within three weeks of watching, you can come up with i am noticing these people coming

up, and they are influencing debate. you probably want to engage those guys. they will be important to you. and so i think it is listen to look at who is out there, and come up with who are those people who are important. it is not just one guy at the top. >> george washington university. you make a strong case for looking at public diplomacy in the field and for the most part look at the state department's role in the field. you have also served in large type for embassies where there are a variety of departments and agencies of the u.s. government, and in india you have a strategic dialogue that involves different agencies. could you reflect on who does public diplomacy in the field, in addition to the state department, and what is the state department's role in leveraging those actors? >> one thing i can think of is usaid. in india it is huge. it varies. they are influencing the public

debate out there. they have a public role. it has been different with what the state department is. they coordinate in everything they do, so you hope there is a unified message, that they are key communicators overseas. there are other agencies like health and human services can be one, cdc, there is all these people doing things. you want to capture the good things they are doing and expect why it is important what they're doing and chose the partnership between united states and other branches of government. it is not strict diplomacy, but other things that are going on. it is important people see that. in my report i focus on the state department because we have the lead role, but there are a lot of others that support the efforts and do a lot to support public diplomacy. >> good morning. from the bureau of middle east

north africa affairs at the state department. walter and i work together. walter, i would love to hear your comments on how you approach issues of religious faith and tolerance, both in saudi arabia and in pakistan, and some of the creative programs that i know you did in saudi arabia would be of interest. what i am sure he is about is how you avoided an inflammatory exchange or engagement, but rather kept it more at a level of mutual understanding and of interest in the issue on both sides. >> yeah. religion is a fascinating one. i speak in my report, i think we have to realize the establishment clause is not to avoid religion, to appoint a specific religion, and it is an effective way to engage people. i think of someone who can to saudi arabia when i was there who was jewish and his father had recently died. in the jewish faith you read every days certain passages from

the torah to honor your father. when he mentioned that to the saudis, they loved that. he was open about what he was doing religiously and they respected that. we have to be open about that. it is something that is important for them. there is much more religion in their daily debate than you might hand here. we cannot shy away from that, but rather embrace it as something that is worthwhile, and one thing -- explaining that the united states is religious. that is always surprising to audiences. a journalist in boston, said he had 10 churches within a few blocks in boston, and he never realized americans were so religious. i think that is something that is a barrier and breeds a lack of trust in who we are, because

religion is so important to them, and what they see coming out of america does not portray that as much as that is part of our lives. i think at state we have to embrace that. not proselytize, i'm not saying that, but be open that we are religious and believe that, too, because it opens a lot of doors for you when you speak about that. >> the other piece is when american religious figures to things that are polarizing in the middle east or seem to be disrespectful. is there anything other than to explain that nobody speaks for the government and we have a big messy democracy? >> we do that a lot. [laughter] there are a couple of well-publicized cases recently in which we need to engage on that and try to explain the first amendment. the first amendment is a tough

one, because most countries do not have it. we are it. there are a lot more research and even in western europe and what you can say that in the united states. it is a hard concept get across because those people can use that and can get a lot of press, even though they have a very small following in the united states. while you can talk about the first amendment, you need to explain that these are not mainstream people, that what they are saying is not something that a lot of americans are people -- picking up more what americans feel. certain ones do. the best defense is to be as open as you can about it, try to explain it, and in some ways that the message fall flat for the united states and say what effect does this have on what we do? often the proof is it has very little effect on us. but we are constantly dealing

with those guys. it is troublesome. but we have to explain this is our society and how we do it, but look at the results. >> do they throw back at us the same thing of all the people who are nursing terrorism, you throw us all in the same basket? >> yes, we hear constantly how varied muslims are, and in the field you appreciate that. muslims are like you and me. they just want a middle-class life, get their kids educated and all that. a lot of them recognize the problem they have got. in pakistan, a senior official i became friends with used to say america, do not abandon us, you are our best hope. it is not a message you hear back here often, but something that is felt there. when right after we killed bin laden i was there and i was talking to the driver, and he was from abbottabad, and i said, have you ever seen the house?

he said, i have not, but my family is going by now, everybody is looking at it. he said, i am glad you got that i because last august my brother-in-law was in a market when a bomb went off. he was buying something. he was killed. so my sister and her three daughters, children, do not have a father, and she has moved back in with us. these guys caused a lot of trouble here, and i'm glad you did what you did. it is a message you do not hear back your as much. on a daily basis when you're out there, you hear that a lot, and these are people who try to distinguish themselves from the stereotypes of what muslims are like and speaking from the heart. you cannot be helped but affected by that. the troublemakers out there -- sure, there are, and they do not like it any more than we do. >> thank you. a question all the way in the back. >> thank you.

my name is lynn, and i have overlapped with walter professionally. later, during his last days, i worked with him. now i met the broadcasting board of governors where the governing board has an opportunity to change the emphases and focuses on the agency overtime in the wake of 9/11, for example, creating the middle east broadcasting network and others. i wondered, if he would like to address how personalities and changing emphases of the undersecretaries over time may have affected how the muslim majority countries are perched, either to the way the united states' actions, to public programs that have been launched or relaunched over time. >> that can be a minefield. i can speak about the one i work for, judith mchale, and her approach was different, and one

that i think still lives on today in a way that i very much like. that is when usia merged with the state in 1999, it was not a complete merger, and a lot of the function having to do with planning did not follow. she had been hit with discovery and realize the importance of bring that in, and she did a good job of giving ace tool of should you just planning. this was 10 years after the merger. it is invaluable. i think more work needs to be done, but i think this planning -- we have limited resources, and the more you can plan what is important to not spend your money and resources on personnel and all that, on what is

unimportant, that that makes a huge difference. one of the most difficult things about that position is how much it has been vacant, and matt armstrong has written about it in his blog about how the position has been vacated 1/3 of its existence. that hurts public policy. we would like to have public best people in there and emphasizing what we can do and putting resources and giving some direction to what we do. >> why do you think it has been at the so long? >> an interesting question. a lot of people who want to do it, i would think, and when i have spoken to that, they enjoyed it. something like james glassman said he had a great time and wished he could do more. my sense is that it is harder -- they have looked out generally at -- they do not use career people there, so to find the right person who is out there who they think can do the job -- meaning the state department --

it takes a little more time perhaps then something else. but probably every case is separate, individual-wise. judith came in quickly when obama came in. they moved quickly to bring her in as fast as the confirmation process would allow. i am not sure why on an individual basis the others took so long. i wish it were not like that. >> hi, walter. i wonder if you can describe some of the ways in which your program in saudi arabia tried to foster civil society. >> ok. well, i was here in 2006, 2007, when we had fought back bitter

terrorist attacks earlier. the saudis have done a lot for it. we had a view of what the united states works, that there were some things that they could see that would be worth borrowing. and part of that was just exposing people to the united states in a way they never had before. it was everything from using muslim-americans in mecca to talk about things like how we deal with health problems, to a photo exhibit where we worked with "national geographic," and with that photo exhibit we could go to places where americans traditionally did not go. we partnered with the saudi ministry of culture -- judith. hoping when people saw that some of the extremists there would say maybe america is not all that bad and that maybe this lack of america is not something these extremists would say that would get us the mileage, that

there is another side to make them hesitate and say not all americans are bad. i look right in front of you at a person who was with me in saudi arabia who was innovative in going out and working with a lot of these communities where american embassy people have not been before. and she was a wonderful asset to have us. the exposure to an american like that could talk to them about who they were. there was another project out there that i greatly admired, and that was a breast cancer project, tying up the komen foundation with a foundation with in texas, and breast cancer is a harmful problem there. tying komen with the treatment of the center was a wonderful project, where wonderful came together, fully supported by men, and i thought it was just a brilliant program to sort of show how you can tackle this problem in what you might say

civil society in a very fine way, using us as an example, because we do that. we tie the awareness together with the treatment. stuff like that i think had a lot of impact, and judging from saudis you speak to, the attention it got, any attention from them tells you are on to something there. >> can you say more about gender? there is a presumption that foreign policy is a men's game. i know from what i know of your programming that, like with susan komen, you were reaching out to all kinds of audiences, as the united states thinks about engaging broadly, and we know that women play roles in families, determining who takes place in boycotts, how should we think about engaging women as the distinct, women in foreign policy? >> you have to engage women on both levels as professionals, foreign policies -- they fit

those opinion leader positions because while there might be fewer, they are out there who have an impact. watch lebanese tv is to see all those announcers and reporters who are women and realize that nbc has broadcast broadly in the mideast and they are certainly -- you're going to engage -- >> because so many of the presenters are so attractive. >> whatever it takes. they are presenting news and points of view, and you want to work with them on those very serious hard-core political issues. but i think dan in looking at how you engage a larger grouping, you have to find what is important to them, and make sure the things we are talking about are important to them. for example, if you talk about glass ceilings in corporations

or something and things like that, that is important for a very small group. it is important, but not a broad-based effort. what you have to do is look at something that perhaps does have a larger impact on women and look at the education, gender-based violence, all these other things that really hit a broader society, and maybe share some of our ideas and really share, not about lecturing ordering anything like that, show what we do and see whether they can borrow something that might fit with their society. you cannot impose this on them. they will work at their own speed and at their own time to do it, but exposing them to some of our better practices cannot hurt. you might find they are seeing us do some things that are not right, so they might look at some aspects of our society, where tv shows show

licentiousness in america, and you have to put those in context of what they are. their television shows and not reality, and you have to deal friendly with these issues, because i found sometimes these make a greatest barriers to understanding the united states and anything else, is they see that portrait of america, whether it is accurate or not, and generally it is not accurate, saying i do not like it, and you say there's more to america than what you see on the shows. >> reality tv is not reality? >> "jerry springer" -- but another program speaks to real women's issues. they should see a little bit less jerry springer. >> retired from the u.s. council for international business, and i am looking at that paragraph called "the private sector." you said a free conversation with harvard executives might be

an inexpensive alternative. if i am a head of the ibm office of mumbai and my job is to make ibm grow a seamless operation, what should i do? do i want to get engaged in this, and it is like walking on egg shells? to what extent can u.s. global companies play a positive role without cracking the egg shells? >> sure. it is interesting because we work with us. if you take something like microsoft, you have every interest in intellectual property rights that we do and they are very vocal about it. they bring people together, send them off of in training programs to the united states. they do a lot of things like that. i love companies that are augmenting what we are doing work on, limiting what we do for their own reasons, but they happen to hit a lot of our ideas read one thing i was mentioning about that, what i thought was interesting, i saw this in

pakistan, we put out with aid a contract to ad agencies, and i was part of the committee to choose one, and i found that -- and i had been in advertising so i could read to the mumbo-jumbo -- and what was interesting is when you have an ad agency talk about what works, you're not getting the guy to think about you are one thing, this is some guy with 20 five years of experience selling products there, and has a good sense of how this stuff works. one thing that came through in a love these contracts was that do not use sms. that is spam. my time in washington -- use sms. who are you going to believe? these ad agencies returned to move her, have a good sense of what did work and what cannot. we can also learn from the failures -- i mentioned and mcdonald's campaign here that was covered in "the new york times," but the social media

backfired on them and it turned out to be something different. we can learn from what these companies do. my final conclusion -- it is funny because i do go back to india and i talk to a guy at an ad agency -- what are we surprised about how you communicate in india? there's a lot of experience we can tap into that. we tend not to be so good going with the private sector on that, but they have a lot of experience on this and can tell us a lot. >> we have time for one more question right there, sir. >> thank you very much. the british embassy. i feel i need to ask a question to show that we are here and we are listening.

[laughter] i wanted to ask about the balance between efforts in washington and efforts in country, where you are blessed with huge numbers of foreign journalists. what extent can you use them to influence the message that you are receiving in country, and what are the things are the best experiences you have heard of that happening? >> what is the last part? >> good examples of engagement of the foreign media here to influence. >> ok. we regularly engaged in foreign journalists that are there, and we do it with the americans out of courtesy because they are fellow americans because we're there to help out. but also one thing is interesting is how what they write can boomerang back into the society. the fact is when i was in pakistan i saw what i covered was covered there, and so it is important to make sure they are giving a perspective for what is

going on. they engage with an awful lot of people in whatever host country they are in, and so by the questions they ask, you learn a lot about a country when we have chats with them. one of the difficult things is they have difficulty getting access to a lot of these places. some countries that do, some do not, some throw them out, some have minders. it is not something -- you cannot use them everywhere all the time. they are just not around. you will always have a wire reporter because it is often a local, but get a newspaper guy in there is different. in pakistan, we were spoiled because every major media organization had a representative there. in india i can say, although it outside the scope of the report, new delhi is a huge hub for international journalists. wherever we are, we like them.

we use them. it is important to mitigate them when they ask us questions. they are not our target. they are not the guys we are out there to reach. it is what we do in addition to reaching out to whatever the host country is. i think that is always something to be aware of. for us a real success is when we see a story that appears in the middle east press or al jazeera, something we have worked with them on, more than if something were to appear on bbc. once again i get back to that for an accurate, trust and all that, that certain organizations, we will or wrote deeper and have a broader audience than others. we want to make clear who we are trying to work with the most here. >> walter, i want to thank you for presenting not only a fascinating report, but also a broad-ranging discussion that the ministries how rich the

field of public diplomacy is. i want to thank you for coming. we look forward to seeing you again soon. thank you. >> thank you. thanks, john.

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and then of course, the most , nidal malikng perpetrated at the time. when we talk about the lone wolf , the individual acting on his or her own. there is an increasing number of women who are also involved. we can look at the nonpolitical motivation and then we the political motivation. think what we i are going to discuss today are that wey the two sides have to consider.

but mostly the political side. least spend a semester at discussing the various trends. we're not going to do that. i think it would useful in terms of context to discuss the phenomenon which is not very well understood. thatve to keep in mind terrorists are not born, they are created by various political, social, economic environments. in other words, the lone wolf terrorists do not appear from outer space. they are part of our societies. they are subject to the political, social, and economic ideologies. and their religious environments. many of them share values through technology, through

websites and so forth. a cell operates -- some operate on one basis, and others operate on multiple effects. there were some studies developed the years. we are trying to follow it lately. it requires a great deal of interest in terms of radicalization. the international society tries to understand what are some of the root causes and what can be done to deal with that. discussiontoday's contextvide the initial for our discussion. mikeirst speaker is

bowman, who has a rich background in the government, and the military, diplomatic and academic activity. at cw.eaching one course one of our interns is a student in his class. you can prepare for the class tomorrow. mike has very broad experience in the government and in counterintelligence. positionsrious other and, as ibi indicated, he has a very rich academic background. we are looking forward to his remarks. then we are going to follow up

with our other panelists. hopefully then we will develop a the audience.h mike, would you mind coming up here? >> ok. i will let you get by. thank you, yonah. i first started thinking about terrorism] 9/11. at the time i was the deputy general counsel for national security affairs at the fbi. know an awfulnot lot about al qaeda at that point in time. though we began to look into it very quickly.

him him the things that we learned -- along the things that we learned was that there was a number of training camps being run by al qaeda in afghanistan. we realized that while al qaeda was trained in the camps in afghanistan, an awful lot of other people have gone through theirre too. affiliated with al qaeda or intending to do something on a terrorist plane. perhaps going there for training for something later on. we begin to think about what would happen if one of those people began to decide to do something. unattached, unaffiliated. the reason that made a big difference. the way we look for terrorists and spies and so forth was largely through the foreign intelligence surveillance act. which is operated by a secret court.

it has secret warrants for wiretaps and physical searches. war andicate for a fisa is that the target is either a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. if you have a person acting on is hard to talk that person into an agency or a foreign power. after 9/11, i suggested that perhaps we could have an amendment to the foreign intelligence surveillance act to look at this single person. this caused consternation because it did change the way we thought about the act from the start. we eventually did get an amendment to the act for that purpose. we also began to realize some other things that might happen. one of the things that started us thinking along a different line was soon after 9/11, dutch

foreign intelligence produced radicals ins about their part of the world. one of the really startling things that came out of that was oft they did not find a lot ideologues. they found people who seemed to seems to have an affinity for violence. they wanted to do something violently. as a consequence, they started looking at those individuals. that did disrupt not only in the netherlands but in other countries, some things that were beginning to happen -- or were planned to happen. to look at that. and then another thing happened in 2005. we had the british underground bombings. we began to look at that and think, we have got people in the

too.ry that this contends something we have not focused on all that much since timothy mcveighs. we might have people not affiliated with al qaeda on the we might have people in our own communities who want to do violence. we began to think more and more that there might be some other thing to do about this. when i testified in 2002 in , asking for the foreign intelligence surveillance act to be amended, congress was very skeptical. ready to accept the fact that we might have other types of individuals in the u.s.. d of time forio congress to come around. they eventually did. the only thing that has happened

through the years is that we have fairly well decimated the ability of al qaeda and al qaeda-type affiliates to carry out the large, complex type of operation that 9/11 represented. could it happen again, yes. the what is more likely? -- but what is more likely? i will give you a prediction. in the u.s. and most western countries, future terrorist acts be lesse likely to th well organized and we saw with my 11. less likely to succeed. they're less likely to be as legal if they do succeed -- as al if they do succeed. they are going to be more numerous. beelieve that they will mostly conducted by citizens are long-term residents of the u.s. why do i say that?

first of all, i think that is what the sequence of events that i have just laid out point us towards. but secondly, if we stop and take a look at what has happened in the u.s. since 9/11, we have had over 50 terrorist -- according to fbi reporting -- over 50 terrorist attempts to feed it. we have had -- attempts defeated. we have also had a number of terrorist associated persons arrested. of those who had some link of al qaeda or al qaeda-type philosophy, more than half for u.s. citizens. 35% were born in the u.s. 60% have a college degree. 60% were either working or in school. these were not the people that

we were looking at right after 9/11. these were not the discontented arabs who were going to camps in afghanistan to try and learn how to make an explosive. to try and learn tactics or go learn to shoot a gun. basically, we are looking at today an entirely different cadre of people know we thought about many years ago -- different cadre of people then we thought about many years ago. i don't think we are looking at it hard enough. i don't think we are focused enough on the lone wolf, who might have no affiliation with anybody. you might not even be an ideologue -- who might not even be an ideologue. who might just want to blow something up because he is a discontent. think back to the example of timothy mcveigh. we have seen others in the u.s. as well.

that is what the future holds for us. i will leave it there. >> obviously, i think the way you described it -- there is no doubt about your analysis on the basis of what already happened. not only u.s. citizens or permanent residents, but also those who come here to study on a visa or illegals as well. characterized in the european countries as well. as we have seen with the tragedy somerway, in the name of

secular ideologies. this is the wave of the future. we are going to have another discuss the issue with dr. kumar, whom i .ntroduced earlier he is teaching at georgetown's school of foreign service, he specializes in the financial aspects as well as on south asia, the case study in that region. bring in some of his findings and perspectives. then we will have a third focus on weapons of mass destruction. dr. kumar,, peter -- dr. kumar,

would you kindly come up here. and mikehanks to yonah for having me here. it is an honor to be here. previous speaker for an excellent presentation. essentially, i am going to run through some important aspects of lone wolf terrorism, incorporating some south asian examples. when we talk about what is lone wolf terrorism, most people consultative -- most people contemplate it with one person who plans and finances it. the reality is, especially in political terrorism, the radicalization process. a single individual may cover y perpetratet -- mau the act.

but he may be radicalized through a group or the internet or army experience. that is a distinction one has to be clear about. the knee-jerk response is just because it is a single individual, he must be a lone wolf. butay not be a terrorist, he may be a terrorist as well. he may be a covert or overt member of a terrorist organization. some previous interface with an organization. some previous travel in terrorist camps. if you look at the boston bomber, one had traveled to central asia. it is hard to call the person who travels a lone wolf terrorist. dagestandoctrinated in , along with the internet. secondly, it has been alluded to -- the types of lone wolf

terrorists. lay could be secular, a timothy mcveigh. theould be single issue, unabomber. 2001, heax attacker in had criminal intent. it is hard to be one or the other. it could be a mishmash of all the five categories or one or more. what factors contribute? social and political grievances, psychological disorders. the affinity with our membership of terrorist organizations. then there could be a broadcasting of terrorist intentions. anders breivik had

broadcast what he was going to do. there are signals that the loan will full be something spectacular. then there is the role of enablers. or instance, the internet previous military experience. then there are catalytic agents. there could be personal or political triggering events. timothy mcveigh went the radicalization after an first gulfin the war. he developed a loathing for the federal government. have all these basketcase folks who may be radicalized in one or many ways. then there are what we called stochastic terrorism. basically folks like it's always here he -- although we hear he al-olks like bin laden and

zawahiri. -- perpetrator of the act what do terrorist organizations achieve using lone wolf terrorism? i will focus on how organizations might utilize lone wolf attackers. achieve?hey their low cost, greater impact, require low planning. they are difficult to predict. there is the aspect of plausible deniability. if you look at the mumbai bombings. are celebrating the fifth anniversary of the attacks in mumbai on november 26, 2008 when the 60 hour carnage began. the news report said it was the

mujahedin. then we discovered he was engaging in possible deniability. it is an offshoot of it. there could be threats of the indian mujahedin or a local criminal gang. this has happened before. if you look at it: hadley -- david coleman headley surveillance. is he a lone wolf terrorism or sent there to act as a lone wolf to make you believe that there is an individual acting on his own. there is a case of the man involved in the plot to survey the financial institutions in new york and new jersey and washington. -- then there is the need

the requirement on the part of the global terrorist to communicate -- the requirement on the part of the lone wolf to communicate with members of the organization. this is the plausible deniability. it is the individual. attacks aslone wolf far as terrorist organizations go, they show would be lone wolf ves, here is one guy, all of you can do the same thing. what al qaeda said this september. wolvesng would be lone to terror. what strategies can be used? posing, easier said than done. the washington metro bus -- say something if you see something.

that is a typical example of what can be done. i would consider a lone wolf terrorist as someone who executes and finances and plans the attack, but is radicalized by in external agent. for example, the terrorist organization. the internet, the notary, previous travel, part of a sleeper cell or what have you. then there is the need for federal, state, and local information sharing. cksing to nip would be a tatta in the bud. then there is monitoring, that brings in a civil liberties issue. with what powers can the government monitor the internet? it can and it showed. it is brewing over the internet. what kind of messaging, chatting, would be the wolf plots.sts financing

what kind of interactions does he have? question ofs the rapid response. if the norwegian authorities have responded after the first attack to understand that -- att breivik, it is difficult to predict, but if they had responded, he may not have perpetrated the second attack. that had larger casualties. then there is the question of investigating not just lone wolf attacks, but the botched plots. there is so much more one can learn from a botched plot. the underwear bomber. there is so much more one can learn from a plot that has been foiled. what kind of implications does global terrorism have for counterterrorism? detect,fficult to

unorthodox strategies are called for. community policing. city strategies need to be designed to prepare for, respond, and prevent terrorist attacks. it is difficult to make out when we are doing this whether the attack is by a criminal or by a secular terrorist. -- a secular terrorist, a religious terrorist, or an idiosyncratic terrorist. it is difficult to address the potential plot were perpetration of attacks. there are issues of whether lone moreterrorist attacks are possible in developed societies versus developing societies. in the context of south asian nations, their information sharing methods and their monitoring measures are not as good as ours.

there is a thinking amongst intelligence circles that it is plotr to plan a lone wolf in a place like india or any other country in south asia then the developed world. there is an opportunity to study what is going on in terms of the attacks and wolf other developing societies. the real possibility of terrorist attacks here. i want to talk about radicalization. i want all of us to look carefully at what does radicalization and tail? -- en tail? when we say bin laden is gone, al qaeda is damaged, we are upset -- we are obsessed with the organization of al qaeda. there is the al qaeda ideology, which we have not been able to do much about. prisonscalization in

are important strategies. then there is the al qaeda movement, which is still intact. if you look at the ideology or the movement of al qaeda to grab local separatists. mali, or other parts of the world. the separatists in south asia, the taliban. that, coupled with the fact that there is increased interaction amongst affiliates of al qaeda the would-be or potential lone wolf terrorist part of this movement. there is some connection, either ideological or in person or both. sprainifficult to really to a judgment. -- spring to a judgment.

if it is an individual, it is only an individual act. radicalization is a kind of material support as well. most people would not recognize it. we have got to go beyond the obvious. what appears on the service may not be true. dig deep and look at crucial aspects of radicalization. more can be done in terms of engagement with the imprisoned individual. or to prevent someone who has been imprisoned for criminal activity not to become a terrorist. your education -- through education or employment outside prison. a lot of literature deals with recidivists. folks who have been left out of guantanamo bay and are perpetrating attacks in aqap or syria or yemen. that is it for now, thank you.

>> our next speaker is kyle olson. he has a very rich experience as well -- consulting and advising and theents and industry academic community. particularly related to the nature of the threat. ira member very vividly after the attack -- i remember very vividly after the attack in tokyo with sarin, mass destruction, you are kept quite .usy to make sense of that i really think with your wide experience, share with us your thinking about various scenarios

with the useties of what we call some sort of ,eapons of mass distraction whether chemicals, the sarin, or the anthrax. some cases we have seen in the u.s. and abroad related to eaths -- kyle,se, here please come up here. >> thank you. the lone wolf terrorist is obviously a subject of great interest and concern. through several questions out at the beginning. you asked whether or not the

future for terrorism in general but certainly the lone wolf terrorist -- are we looking at something worse than 9/11? you asked about whether society can't survive. you asked whether or not democracy and our freedoms can survive. all, echoing a couple themes which were already voiced. represents a unique problem. we sometimes through the label terrorism or terrorist around too expensivel -- into expansive a fashion. it may be criminal activity or revenge. the terrorism word puts it in a comfortable basket for many of us. that can lead us down a sometimes slippery slope from an analytical point of view. i would note that when i think we often lone wolf,

see timothy mcveigh as an example of a loan wolf. he had some help. or semi-lone wolf terrorism is a similar threat. something significantly below the level of al qaeda or al qaeda affiliate. at the same time, it represents something outside that construct. the reason i get there is or someone lone wolf with a very small group has the potential for accessing weapons that we would lump into the weapons of mass destruction category. the chemical-biological- radiological hierarchy is one we can look at and say many of these are in the breach of an individual. look at the notion of being able to access some quantity of toxic calculus.

-- chemicals. that does not need to be a mass kill-off. it does not need to produce body counts of 100s. the introduction of a chemical into a school building, access to cylinders of chlorine or other materials has the potential to create a toxic event. 9/11 scale? probably not. but the threat is there. there are materials available that are accessible, whether we are talking about getting capturing,antities, disrupting, diverting trucks and truck loads of material. projectionack on a -- even an attack on a production or storage facility. the collateral effects are significant. someonehe capability of

with even a remote area understanding of the fact that if there is a label on the side that said -- with even a rudimentary understanding of the fact that if there is a label on the side that says it is bad, it is bad. you sent in the 1990's required investments on the score of hundreds of thousands of dollars and a commitment to work on that problem over a period of time. that is may be something that this images that kind of a threat. maybe it pushes it out of the classic lone wolf pattern. i do not ignore the fact that maintained a campaign, but his work was small package bombs which he produced. probably, in as are outside the

scope of an individual but not a small group. biological weapons, we hear about the poor man's atom bomb. the biological threat is legitimate in the sense that biological weapons can be self and the environment. you do not need a large industrial base if you have access to stocks up front. an infectious disease. as anyone who has survived flu season will tell you, the little kid next stories a delivery device. the biological threat can be an example of a talented dabbler working in his own laboratory or diverting research facilities in a university or hospital setting. the technology is there. biological weapons -- the reference was made to the anthrax attacks earlier in this decade.

1950's technology is level weapons grade technology. biological agents have been used as a weapon either with great conscious thought in advance or as a collateral effect going back for hundreds of years. an individual could find a way to apply a biological weapon. are we talking about a society killer or a city killer? probably not. wolf -- this is true for all weapons of mass destruction or mass killing scenarios. terrorist operates in a vacuum in terms of supervision, in terms of restrictions or limitations, in terms of any kind of filter on what is or is not acceptable. the true lone wolf terrorist is only answerable to him or

herself. by the way, that means that many of the traditional deterrent tactics that we use as governments, as militaries, law enforcement organizations -- short of identifying and capturing attackers -- are not going to have much impact. the lone wolf operates without committees and without worrying about going before in appropriations board. he does what he can do when he wants to do it to his timetable. the -- obviously, high explosives fall within that universe. the one that is probably of most significant concern in terms of its real footprint is the radiological threat. 10 years or 15 years, one of the recurring ofstions on the part

security planners everywhere is why haven't we been hit with a dirty bomb? dirty bombs are the easiest probably --e whole in that whole panopoly of choices. rheologicalntity of material, it does not have to be high-grade, wrapped around explosives and detonate. the effects do not have to be lethal. the cultural impacts of detonating a radiological dispersal device in a major urban area -- the monumental core of the city of washington -- would be said sancho. the auclair notice is one of the almost -- would be substantial. r notice is all messed impossible to obtain. a dirty bomb went off, but you

are safe. let's not leave out cyber attacks. you could argue that the recent actions by anonymous as well as the release of the nsa files constitutes an act of terrorism. the impacts have been dramatic and political in nature. but they have also had impacts far beyond what you would expect to find on a thumb drive. once again, that is an example of an intelligent individual, and arrogant individual, and it is associated -- and a disassociated individual carrying out what he or she sought to be a legitimate individual authority. going back to 9/11. for the lone wolf, i would argue that a 9/11 spectacular or event with that kind of a body count

is probably beyond their reach. probably. you could have the perfect storm. you can argue that 9/11 itself was the perfect storm. it exceeded the expectations of al qaeda. will society survive? yes. we are more resilient than any one individual or one small group of individuals. are a society of 350 million within a larger society of 6 billion. but asking the question about democracy and our rights and values. operates without the restrictions, the filters, the constraints that we associate with organizations. even terrorist organizations like al qaeda had a command structure and the decision matrix. the lone wolf gets up and feels like killing you, he will kill you. i look forward to our

discussion. i think you raise some profound issues and questions. i hope we can develop a discussion among the panelists as well as the audience. to, is why i think we have in our analysis, make a distinction between the groupdual terrorist and a as well as state-sponsored terrorism. by the way, as a criticism of the deal, whether it is a historic deal or not. concerns of some members of

congress and others that in the package there was no indication related to state-sponsored involvement iran's in syria and so forth. is the nature, the intensity of the thread on the part of states, groups like al qaeda and the individual. what is actually correct -- what is absolutely correct that you mentioned in terms of the impact is the number of attacks 2%cording to studies, maybe of all terrorist attacks, we are talking about thousands, are related to the individuals. a veryack can have significant impact.

i mentioned the assassination of the prime minister of israel, rabin. we focused our seminars and so -- that undermined the peace process for many years. it is not only the number, but the impact. of the areas that we still have to consider, not only the political and nonpolitical -- how many attacks we had in the u.s. in the schools. the availability of guns. in fact, one of the most recent anthrax or some other device that was sent to president obama and to the new york city man bloomberg -- mayor

bloomberg, was related to that issue. we have to look at the broader picture and the issue of radicalization. abouttrue what you said the individual who does not look at some approval by his peers or colleagues, he has no constraints whatsoever. that individual does not exist in a vacuum in terms of radicalization. mentioned themar technology, social media, for example. the internet and so forth. that they had. -- the inspiration that they have. what i propose that we can discuss is the issue, how is the lone wolf being created?

thedicated that in general terrorists are not born but they are. -- they are created. we can condemn them, has erved, we can be against evildoers but we cannot understand the minds of the evildoers. we cannot understand the mind of the lone wolf. do you want to respond to some of the comments? dr. kumar? with yonah about the radicalization peace. as much as the radicalization and counter radicalization could could takeavior, -- care of behavior, they cannot impact ideology. these impacts -- the symptoms

could be taking care of, but in terms of the ideology, which is so profound. whatever the agents could be, triggering events, folks like al awlaki,ri or al- loose affiliate members or so members or attackers,one wolf not much can be done as far as ideology. we do not understand why they have this ideology. other feature is the hatred towards the u.s., israel, and allies. -- towards aof global islamic caliphate. this is why they have foot soldiers. they foot soldiers with a cause.

they may not have the kind of terrorist leaders as part of an organizational network or the financiers. the ideology is something they import from the outside. to the extent that this attracts with mental dilapidation or mental disagreement or other personal or political gradients pi - local gradients is -- olitical greviances. these guys can be criminals who are radicalized. idiosyncratic and have funny behavior patterns. it is difficult to come out with measures, per se. i would look at the ideology and the whole radicalization process as the more important object to study. you are right in saying it is important how these lone wolves

are created, incubated, made. rather than how they perpetrate the act at the end stage. or how they plan. external influences on a wood -- on a would-be lone wolf need to be studied. beis hard to theorize and studied in the absence of case studies. every attack is unique and special, with a different message and ideological impact and so on. lone wolf terrorism cannot be a typology. it is only a tactic that could be used by would be terrorists as well as non-terrorists. >> thanks. spike, can i ask you a question from the law enforcement point of view?

one concern is the role of intelligence and the sharing of intelligence in terms of different agencies. how do you see this, especially in light of the recent .evelation of the nsa saga theerms of the question of civil liberties concerns that you have worked on for so many years? was alwaysberties one of the biggest concerns we had at the fbi. unlike is unlike nsa, the central intelligence agency. ourof what the nsa collects u.s. persons, not foreigners. we have always been concerned about that.

i received at least one phone call a day from agents in the do this, asked can i should i do this, where is the line? mentionsomething that i that only to emphasize the fact that this was a real issue. if you come up to today and look at what the nsa is doing, several different things. first, what the nsa is doing is collecting metadata. what the newspapers have not told you is the metadata is constitutionally on effective -- unprotected. it does not belong to you, it belongs to telephone companies. companies can do what they want with it except give it to a federal officer without being compelled to do so. that is one thing. i will say that when i argued for the creation of that 215 of theticle

patriot act, when i argued for that, i never dissipated -- i do not think anybody anticipated -- is beingbe used as it used today. we look at it as being something that would target a single person for something. that is another thing that is happening. if you take the program and work it backwards to 9/11. if we had had the opportunity at llateto: -- to co telephone numbers, phone numbers, and frequent flyer numbers, none of which is constitutionally protected, we could have discovered all 19 hijackers in the u.s. i am not telling you we would have prevented 9/11 from happening. all of themscovered here and we have been following

them and watching them and sell them down the airplanes, 99% certain that what would have happened is the fbi agents who were following them would have noted the plane they were got -- notably plane they got on, where they were going, and called the field office and told them to pick them up when i got there. but you can do this information, valuable information that is constitutionally unprotected. the thing you have to ask yourself -- this is what the public needs to ask itself. two phases. the flip side of the question here. thequestion is do you want government to do everything it can to protect you? the other question is, do you want the government to look and record every time you visit a website or make a phone call? those are real questions. that now, i will tell you

as a matter of law, what the nsa is doing for privacy purposes is not a privacy interest. -- a privacy intrusion. i will leave it to the judges of courts to determine whether the activity is lawful. 11 senior judges have said it is. but nobody's privacy is being affected by this program. very much for this clarification. i suggest that we develop some sort of discussion in terms of number one, the radicalization process of some of these individuals. or the way from alienation unemployment or whatever it is. secondly, what are some of the strategies that are available to deal with these on the local level, the national level, and

the international level? thosee in the audience who have very broad experience in government and outside governments. i would like to invite them to participate. who worked at the state department's counterterrorism office. would you share some of your views on the lone wolf idea? >> maybe i can project. first, i want to pick up abouting spike said people who have a tendency for violent acts. there is a psychological aspect to this. a. saw this with the ir when they reached an agreement, some people could not put down .he tools it seems to me one of the goals

we have not talked about is that the fbi has conducted sting operations against lone wolves. it would be interested -- i would be interested to get your thoughts, what are the guidelines? the other thing that occurs to me, the psychological aspect. there may be some similarities between people who conduct violence for various reasons like the shootings that we have etc., andavy yard, people who do it for terrorist motives. part of a problem is to typing somebody before they go off the deep end. i am struck how many times when they identify the culprit, the neighbors say we did not know or he seemed to be a nice guy. nothing out of line. it turns out that there were some indicators along the lines. my daughter is in the same neighborhood as the boston bombers.

it was only later that people said oh yeah, this guy sounded strange or radical. where is that dividing line with privacy? where people report it? it is still a fuzzy area, we have not been able to address. getting back to tools, one of them is the nsa intercepts of the patterns you talk about. the other is the sting operations. the third is the radicalization. i disagree with you that you cannot get rid of ideology. if you can somehow discourage people from acting on that ideology, we are ahead of the game. it is a hard thing to measure. it is hard to measure what you succeed or do not succeed in. >> ok. by the way, mike. on the rolemment of the media?

at one time, you covered these events for the media? does the media has a role in terms of the radicalization? >> i think there are two aspects. journalism wasin before the terrorism episodes really developed. it was covering washington and overseas. the attempts of glamorization to -- of glamorization of terrorism as romantic freedom fighters. recruited to the state department in 1985 when the secretary wanted to start a campaign against terrorism. especially in europe and the middle east, people tended to glamorize terrorists. the media sometimes plays a role. sometimes inadvertently or by carrying or reporting some of the claims without the

counterbalance. when there is an incident, it is difficult. reports come out.sometimes reporters are reporting what they hear from police officials or local officials who only have part of the story. that is why there is often some us confuse him -- that is why there is often so much confusion. another aspect that we dealt with at the state department. the attacks in london, the libyan or iranian embassy. the press was showing where scotland yard people were stationed. there have been issues and trying to restrain the press from putting information or reporting things that might be useful to a terrorist. this happened in mumbai, too. they were picking up radio reports and newer security forces were. there is an issue of restraining press.

it is more difficult in this country than the u.k. you have some great local -- you reportersny local tv who do not have good relationships with the police or local authorities. the last pitch -- it is important for local authorities, develop good, to relationships with local media so there is trust when you asked them to hold off. >> ok. are there any questions from the audience at this point? yes. please identify yourself for the record. my name is carlos stern. i am retired, i spent some years in the pentagon. i am interested in this field.

i am grateful to sit in. with regard to your example on the 9/11 hijackers, the real clue that was missed was a bunch of foreigners wanting to go to flight school in florida. they expressed openly that they had no need to learn to take off or land. fbi.was reported to the it certainly was a very bright signal. the metaphor congress uses is connecting the dots. the same with the chechen boys. u.s. thatns told the these guys were probably trouble. that was not followed up on. there are many other examples. the reason i bring this up is that one learns more from mistakes and successes. i was hoping to hear a

discussion of failures and how we have mined information from the failures to do better next time. with respect to your examples, you have contemplated two different things with flight schools. one of them was foreigners who -- whoking different were taking flight lessons around the country. learning how to fly. what was misquoted in the papers was the instance of my salary -- the company said he did not want to learn to take off or land. that is precisely what he wanted to do. -- that wasresented misrepresented by the company and reported in the newspapers. the issue about the boston fbiers, i was not with the at the time. i will give you a vignette. when the terrorist screening this is a opened up,

center that has the names of all known or suspected terrorists. it is a large number because there are many aliases that people can use and you can spell mohammed 40 different >> i've not know what was going on the fbi's mind. that was the first thing i thought of what i read in the papers. you are right. we need to learn from our mistakes. one of the issues and learning experiences is the to 15 program today. we are trying to have an ability